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CONCEPTUAL LEARNING: THE PRIORITY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 
1. THE ISSUE 
A recent paper (Haggis, 2004) argued that our understanding of student learning in higher 
education was limited by the dominance of psychological models of learning, evidenced in the 
preponderance of studies precipitated by Marton's phenomenographic findings.  While such a 
claim may be justified, it is important to appreciate that characterisations of deep and surface 
learning (Marton et al, 1993) are descriptions of how students make sense of their learning, rather 
than explanations of learning per se.  The essence of this work is that students may have very 
different intentions for their learning and, as a result, engage in different types of study behaviour.  
Without in any way demeaning the contribution of Marton and his colleagues to understandings 
of learning in higher education, the purpose of this article is to argue, within a psychological 
perspective, that it is the accounts of learning underlying such notions as deep and surface that 
need to be understood more rigorously because without a developed understanding, university 
teaching is unlikely to be compatible with any of the aims proposed for higher education such as 
the pursuit and transmission of knowledge or professional preparation and training (NCUP, 
1996).   
In the United Kingdom there is now considerable diversity in the student population (and so 
higher education is no longer the prerogative of a select minority but is available to many), the 
needs of students are more varied (thereby necessitating the promotion of different modes of 
study to enable students to engage in lifelong learning) and there is a rapid expansion in student 
numbers (thereby stimulating a need for both the employment of new staff who might not 
otherwise have anticipated a career in higher education and for established staff to adapt to the 
changing circumstances).  The varying patterns of undergraduate education, the importance of the 
European dimension and the continuing demand by overseas students to pursue postgraduate 
study in the United Kingdom makes learning in higher education a live and important topic to 
keep under review (Tight, 2004).  Given these factors, it seems important not to lose sight of the 
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kind of learning that universities are best placed to promote.  In deliberating on accounts of 
learning, it is important to be clear about the unit of analysis under consideration, since 
educational issues can be analysed at several theoretical levels.  This article is not a sustained 
examination of what knowledge is or where it originates or is located; which is the proper 
preserve of philosophy.  While philosophy influences educational practice, the concerns of this 
article are about how a person acquires or attains knowledge.  Although knowledge acquisition is 
one of several epistemological issues (Fitzgerald & Cunningham, 2002), it is but one part of the 
overriding concern of knowledge and knowing and as such affords a psychological (Hofer, 2002) 
as well as a philosophical analysis.  In other words because the underpinning concern of this 
article is how students use their conceptions of knowledge and knowing to develop an 
understanding of the world and because the individual's acquisition of personal knowledge is the 
basis of learning in formal education, a psychological level of analysis is thought to have 
functional value in order that teachers can design and implement meaningful pedagogical 
practice, and that educational policy can support such an endeavour.   
2. A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON LEARNING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
The recent increased interest in learning (as evidenced in the growth of journals on the topic) 
suggests that learning is now beginning to be understood to be as important in higher education as 
it is in primary and secondary education.  However, the increased interest seems not to reflect 
extensively the psychological perspective.  While historically a psychological perspective on 
topics such as learning and development, individual differences, instruction, motivation and 
assessment was seen to contribute to the scholarly and rigorous professional knowledge of 
teachers (Shulman, 1990), the relevance of a psychological perspective has been questioned in the 
face of claims that its findings do not address the actual problems that practising teachers 
experience (Berlinner, 1992; Doyle, 1990).  While some believe that psychology does have a 
contribution to make in improving educational achievement (Carroll, 1993), others question the 
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potential of psychology for effective educational application (Chase, 1998).  Perhaps, however, 
the tension turns on the expectations implied by the protagonists of the alternative persuasions.  
The expectation that educational psychology has immediate answers to the myriad of problems 
that teachers face on a day-to-day basis seems rather naïve.  While it may well be that teachers 
need knowledge that provides "quick and concrete answers to situations in which they have little 
time to think" (Korthagen & Kessels, 1999, p.5), such knowledge would seem to reside less in 
psychology and more in the literature on teaching methods.  If teachers believe that they should 
have a repertoire of interesting activities with which to engage learners, in order that they have 
the "quick and concrete answers", then it is follows that it is with these activities that the teachers 
should acquire proficiency.  But if teachers want to understand what learning is and how it takes 
place (in order that they themselves can determine methods of teaching), such understanding of 
learning rests on psychological knowledge.  While it is fully acknowledged that a psychological 
perspective is neither exclusive nor sufficient in explaining all of student learning, it will be 
argued in this article that different orientations to learning have different implications for 
instructional practices and educational outcome which in turn may be incompatible with 
educational policy.   
3. WHAT MIGHT BE MEANT BY LEARNING? 
There is currently a powerful ideology that lifelong learning is needed in order to enable us to 
participate in the ever changing working environment in which we can expect to have a variety of 
roles.  This ideology suggests that much of our learning should be practice oriented and based in 
real-life tasks and situations.  The work-based learning (Brennan et al, 1996; Boud & Solomon, 
2001) and capability movements (O'Reilly et al, 1999; Stephenson &Yorke, 1998) would be cases 
in point.  Another would be the importance placed on field experience by professionals in training 
when asked to evaluate the relative contributions of 'theory' and 'practice' to their learning 
(Holligan, 1997).  This practice-oriented perspective to learning is further buttressed by the 
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research evidence that points to the importance of learners being personally involved in their own 
learning and being motivated by being able to determine for themselves what they are to learn 
(Edwards et al, 1996; Sutherland, 1997).  In this article there is no resistance to the view that our 
extant learning as experienced is important since we bring to any situation a vast array of personal 
theories (John, 1996; LaBoskey, 1993).  However, in spite of the rhetoric to the contrary (O’Hear, 
1988; The Hillgate Group, 1989; Lawlor, 1990), it is not at all clear that experience of itself does 
anything other than confirm our own prejudices particularly in areas in which we lack expertise 
(Feiman-Nemser & Buchmann, 1985).  In other words, while experience may well be important it 
cannot be assumed that it necessarily means learning.  Thus the common sense notion of learning 
as the all-pervasive acquisition of new behaviour and/or knowledge which is made vivid by 
experience (Biggs & Telfer, 1987) is an incomplete characterisation because it assumes firstly 
that acquisition constitutes learning without reference to transfer (Haskell, 2001); and secondly 
that the learning of behaviour and the learning of knowledge are indistinguishable.  There is thus 
a need to understand learning in a much more differentiated way. 
If people are to learn to reason, plan and make good decisions (which is a significant aim of 
higher education), they must be able to generalise what they have learned in the past to new 
learning and be able to apply and extend their learning to a range of situations (Haskell, 2001).  
Because of this need to generalise from one situation to another, the issue of transfer becomes 
pressing.  It is suggested (Pascual-Leone and Irwin, 1994; Salomon & Perkins, 1989) that there 
are two ways in which this transfer occurs.  One is low-road learning involving low cognitive 
functions and referring to concrete, experiential or infralogical learning.  The other is high-road 
learning involving high cognitive functions and referring to abstract, conceptual or logological 
learning.   
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Low-Road Learning In low-road learning previously learned knowledge or practices can be 
evoked and successfully applied in a different situation.  This comes about because the succession 
of contexts for which particular knowledge or particular practice is appropriate are closely similar 
but also require slight adaptation of the knowledge/practice, thereby providing sufficient 
opportunity to allow the flexible and repeated use of the knowledge or practices to an automatic 
level.  Because the knowledge or practices are already developed to a level where they are both 
highly routinised and flexible within the individual's repertoire, they can be applied to the new 
situation.  However, the new situation must be perceived by the individual to have characteristics 
sufficiently similar to those in the earlier situation(s) to trigger the apposite knowledge or 
practices.  The critical feature of low-road learning is its automatic extension into situations that 
appear to be somewhat different but which can be enacted through essentially extant knowledge 
or practices.  Salomon & Perkins (1989) illustrate low-road learning with the example of driving.  
Having learned to drive one car, one can extend to driving other cars and indeed to other 
motorised vehicles.  While the initial sensation of driving the new vehicle may be a bit unsettling, 
one's extant driving skills only need fine tuning to accommodate to the demands of the new 
vehicle.  Low-road learning would explain many socialisation and enculturation processes where 
one's behaviour might have been based on modelling or driven by reinforcement and resulted in 
implicit or unintentional overt performance (Salomon & Perkins, 1989).  However, as Larkin 
(1989) lucidly points out, the frequent application of old knowledge to new situations is the 
popular understanding of transfer.  A more elaborate understanding invokes the requirement to 
learn new knowledge because the context for application is sufficiently dissimilar that extant 
knowledge will not, of itself, suffice.  This is what is meant by high-road learning. 
High-Road Learning In high-road learning there is no automatic transfer of knowledge/practices 
from one situation to another.  Rather transfer is through mindful abstraction (Salomon & 
Perkins, 1989).  This means extracting the generic attributes from some material, situation or 
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behaviour, and creating a mental representation (such as a sign, a picture or a linguistic 
expression) of these attributes.  For example, psychology students in their study of personality 
might notice that situational factors are a recurring theme.  Having noticed that different accounts 
give different weightings to situational factors, the students might then be open/alert to the 
criterial value of the construct in their subsequent deliberations on personality.  The 
representation is the individual's own construction and may also include other knowledge and 
beliefs that the individual imputes into the representation.  By extracting what is understood to be 
central, essential or generic from the material, situation or behaviour, the individual excises 
memory for fine detail in order to reorganise his/her knowledge into more coarse-grained 
generalisations, which can therefore include more instances or examples and as a result be more 
powerful and economical in the thinking process.  This is not to suggest that fine detail is 
unimportant but rather by removing the contextual specificity, the representation can have greater 
application to other examples.  One way of thinking about the process of abstracting is to think of 
it as the construction of a general rule, principle or prototype that covers many instances.  
Although the process of abstraction is perhaps clumsy to describe, it should be thought of as 
something that everyone engages in regularly (Salomon & Perkins, 1989).  Extracting what is 
central, essential or generic allows the individual to make the connection(s) between one context 
or situation and another; either between existing pieces of knowledge or between existing 
knowledge and new knowledge that is just entering the system (Hiebert, 1986).  It is only when 
one can make the connection(s) for oneself that the individual can claim to understand.  
Abstractions that are given to us, foisted upon us or learned in a formulaic fashion do not 
constitute active learning because the distinction and relation between the rule and the instance is 
not understood by the individual.  The importance of 'owning' one's own knowledge in this sense 
is what necessitates the abstraction being a mindful one.  The individual must be metacognitive.  
In other words the individual must exercise volition, control or intention to generalise from 
instances and examples into the more superordinate rules or principles and then use this 
 6
CONCEPTUAL LEARNING: THE PRIORITY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 
abstraction in a new problem or situation.  Salomon & Perkins (1989) illustrate high-road 
learning with the conscious decisions that we make to use particular strategies to solve new 
problems either because the strategies seem to pop up on relevant occasions or because we 
deliberately search for/retrieve previously learned strategies for potential application to the new 
situation.  Mindful abstraction would appear to be what Bereiter & Scardamalia (1989) mean by 
intentional learning, which they characterise as the deliberate, conscious effort which is involved 
in not only completing some assigned task but also to the effort of monitoring and progressing 
one's own understanding of the phenomenon underpinning the assigned task.  This dimension of 
extra effort is also apparent in Barnett's (1999) writing when he variously refers to learning as 
being serious, hard work, demanding, threatening or engaged responsiveness.  . 
The difference between low-road and high-road learning is reflected in the debate on learning 
from examples, as summarised by Chi & Bassok (1989) and Schmalhofer (1995).  The issue turns 
on the extent to which working on examples that are allegedly illuminations of domain 
knowledge promotes learning.  On the one hand examples are viewed as helpful because they 
require students to actively construct knowledge rather than just store it.  On the other, there is the 
view that by concentrating on examples the student's attention is distracted from the underpinning 
domain knowledge.  What the empirical evidence suggests is that even without domain 
knowledge the examples may nevertheless prove useful to students insofar as students can 
construct "an intermediate knowledge representation" (Schmalhofer, 1995, p.259).  However, 
while examples are a preferred and, for beginning students, a necessary instrument for learning, 
empirical evidence points to students who cannot solve problems that deviate only slightly from 
the modelled solution, suggesting that example solutions offer only algorithmic learning (Chi & 
Bassok, 1989), otherwise recognised as low-level learning.  But the evidence also points out that 
if students engage in elaborated explanations of what is happening in the example (rather than in 
description or paraphrasing of what the example 'says') then they have a significantly higher 
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chance of successful problem solving.  In other words, overt explanations of their own 
understanding (which is trying to integrate the givens and constraints in the example with their 
own tacit knowledge and with new domain knowledge) reflect the students' active construction of 
knowledge.  The requirement to incorporate appropriate but new knowledge into one's 
understanding is, as was argued above, the epitome of high-road learning 
3. LEARNING AS THINKING AND LEARNING AS DOING 
An initial attempt to delineate learning seems to suggest two essential types: behavioural learning 
(with exponents such as Thorndike, Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner) and conceptual learning (with 
exponents such as Piaget, Ausubel, Bruner, Gagne).  Behavioural learning is the acquisition and 
application of new behaviour to result in skills and habits not previously in the individual's 
repertoire and would be exemplified in learning a new sequence of dance steps, learning to 
prepare a Bolognese sauce or learning to construct a dovetail joint.  Conceptual learning is the 
acquisition and application of new knowledge to result in concepts and symbolic representations 
not previously in the individual's knowledge network and would be exemplified in learning the 
meaning of new ideas, making connections between two previously unrelated ideas or learning 
the relative merits for retailers of mail-order and supermarket shopping.  In general terms, a new 
behaviour or skill is acquired through practice while ideas and knowledge are acquired through 
understanding.  Another way of characterising this is as task-conscious and learning-conscious 
learning (Rogers 2003).  In task-conscious learning the learner is usually aware of the specific 
task in hand but may not be conscious of learning, while in learning-conscious learning, learners 
are aware that the task they are engaged in entails learning.  Learning itself is the task.  This is not 
to suggest that behavioural learning and conceptual learning are mutually exclusive – many real 
life tasks will require both – but to suggest that any serious consideration of learning should 
recognise a distinction between learning that is concerned with physical, observable behaviour 
and learning which is concerned with the symbolic world of meanings in which people try to 
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construct a coherent and consistent explanation of their experiences.  This latter type of learning – 
conceptual learning or learning through concepts – is important because of its relationship to 
experience, to understanding and to potential behaviour.  Perhaps of even greater significance is 
the flexibility afforded by conceptual learning.  Being able to operate with mental ideas rather 
than only with physical or concrete objects means we can think about not only what is happening 
now, but about what has happened in the past and about what might happen in the future.   
Accounts of Learning: what can they offer us? 
Behaviourist accounts of learning, which for many years have been very influential, essentially 
argue that learning is the result of the reinforcement of behaviours within a context that is 
deliberately manipulated by the teacher.  Although a behaviourist account of learning is eschewed 
in this article, it is nevertheless important to be clear why it is an inadequate account for learning 
in higher education, given that its heuristic value, functional significance and internal consistency 
(to name but three scientific barometers of success) have all been very positively rated in the 
wider educational community of the United Kingdom.  A brief résumé of behaviourist principles 
(Wheldall & Merrett, 1984) will remind readers, perhaps, of some of their own experiences of 
learning, teaching and CPD. 
• Academic and social behaviour is learned.  Although there is an acceptance that genetic 
factors determine certain behaviours, most behaviours of concern to education are 
learned, arguably through appropriate/inappropriate instruction. 
• That behaviours can be learned also means that they can be unlearned: that is, more 
appropriate behaviours can replace inappropriate behaviours.  The behaviourist approach 
to instruction proposes that any behaviour can be increased, decreased, established or 
maintained depending on the level of reinforcement provided. 
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• Learning involves change in behaviour and the purpose of instruction is to produce 
change in each learner’s performance.  Although it is acknowledged that mental 
processing might mediate the stimulus and response, mental processing per se cannot be 
admitted as proper data.  
• Change in behaviour can be measured: before instruction (to establish a baseline 
measurement) and compared with measurement throughout and at the completion of 
instruction to determine gain or loss between data levels. 
Behaviourist accounts thus focus on the functions of behaviour rather than the functions of the 
mind.  The focus on what the teacher does to structure the situation, through reinforcement 
contingencies, implies that learning goals are set by the teacher rather than being shared or 
negotiated with students.  There is also the implication (through the emphasis that just about any 
behaviour can be learned/unlearned through atomistic task analysis) that learning is the accretion 
of skills into increasingly more complex combinations.  The role of the teacher to predict and 
control the behaviour of students by manipulating the environment logically prioritises as very 
low the opportunities for students to determine their own learning goals, to engage in effortful 
tasks or to assess and evaluate learning situations for themselves.  If it is always the teacher who 
determines what is to be taught and defines and plans how the teaching is to take place then 
perhaps it is not surprising that students' higher order capabilities are never required, are never 
facilitated and do not develop.   
However not only has behaviourism been dominant, it continues insidiously to be influential.  A 
passive-reception view of learning and a naive transmission view of teaching can be evidenced in 
the many government driven curriculum reforms in Britain, which assume that curricular 
innovation and development can simply be transmitted to educationalists who will passively 
absorb the decreed changes and then cascade them 'further down the line'.  According to Ernest 
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(1991), such conceptions and strategies are deeply embedded in the public consciousness.  The 
expectations of students, politicians and the general public may then comprise a view of 
instruction that is inconsistent with more recent understandings of learning, thereby making the 
instructional task even more difficult.  However, not only is behaviourism argued to be an 
incomplete account of learning, society's obsessive concern with accountability may well mean 
that the ideology of behaviourism is accepted as dominant with the language of learning 
outcomes, objectives and achievements increasingly distorting teaching towards assessment.  This 
can create a gradual marginalisation of those concepts which remain unexpressed and can lead to 
teaching which is purportedly reformed but merely comprises practices which are grafted on to 
the questionable assumptions of a behaviourist account of learning, thereby losing much of their 
potential to facilitate the intentional learning (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989) which is so 
necessary for higher education.   
Higher education has long professed the aim of encouraging autonomous learning but it has not 
been immune to behaviourism.  Its primary pedagogic method has traditionally been one of 
lecturing, note-taking and memorizing information for later recognition or reproduction, and 
while current lecturing practices might regularly incorporate various manifestations of 'buzz 
groups' (Brown & Atkins, 1988) to engender cognitive engagement (Harvey & Knight, 1996), the 
students' preconceptions of learning may neither include nor recognise the relevance of such 
activities (Prosser & Trigwell, 1999) thus attenuating their pedagogic purpose.  Lecturing is based 
on an account of teaching as predominantly telling and showing.  If we want people to know what 
we know, we tell them and/or show them.  Unsuccessful teaching tends to be remedied by 
repeating the curriculum content, breaking the communication into smaller parts, and finding 
different ways to express the idea to be grasped.  The account of learning on which this traditional 
teaching is based is a behaviourist one that assumes knowledge to be some sort of commodity 
which can be passed from person to person in inert form.   
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Constructivism – an alternative account of learning 
More recently, the education community has begun to question this traditional view of learning as 
increasing research has rendered explanations of thinking and knowing using only behaviourist 
terms to be unsatisfactory.  Instead, we now understand that people learn by being involved and 
by being active in the learning process, often working in collaboration with others.  Constructivist 
explanations, as distinct from behaviourist explanations, are concerned with what might be 
happening in the learner’s head.  This view of students as active constructors and organisers of 
their own learning is reflected in Piagetian theory where the student's construction of knowledge 
is a self-regulating process.  Individuals' cognitive schemes allow them to establish an orderliness 
and predictability in their experiential worlds.  When experience does not fit with the individual's 
schemes, a cognitive disequilibrium results, which triggers the learning process.  This 
disequilibrium leads to adaptation (in which the individual aims to produce coherent, non 
contradictory structures or schemes).  Reflection on successful adaptive operations (reflective 
abstraction) leads to new or modified concepts (accommodation), contributing to re-equilibration.  
Thus from a constructivist perspective, knowledge is not passively received from the world, from 
others, or from authoritative sources.  Rather, all knowledge is created as individuals (and groups) 
adapt to and make sense of their experiential worlds.  Further, Lave (1988), Vygotsky (1978) and 
others argue that the construction of knowing is not a matter of individual, solitary construction of 
understanding, but a dialectical process firmly grounded in a system of social relations.  For them 
all knowledge is socially constructed, regardless of whether it is an individual's personal 
understanding, the very intellectual disciplines that we seek to learn, or the social organizations in 
which we study, work, and play.  Within this perspective, the qualitative restructuring of thought 
is related to the acquisition and use of powerful new tools and signs for mediating thought.  These 
tools and signs are cultural creations and help to shape the structure and organization of 
individual thought by emphasizing particular, socially valued relationships and processes of 
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reasoning.  The means for intellectual change lies in the individual’s appropriation and exercise 
of these socially constructed mediators, as the tools and signs help to organize and shape their 
experiences and interpretations of the world.  This view of knowledge construction represents a 
very significant move from behaviourism in that it recognises that knowing is active and that it is 
based on previously constructed knowledge.   
4. DIFFICULTIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT 
While constructivism has given us a fundamentally different way to think about knowledge 
acquisition and potentially provides powerful analytical tools to unpack the processes of learning, 
its application in higher education appears to be constrained by its lack of prescription of 
pedagogical practices.  The range of instructional practices which teachers need in order to 
genuinely subscribe to a constructivist view of learning are not well understood (Brophy, 2002).  
In other words while constructivism provides an orienting perspective, may change our 
conception of learning, and lead us to question the adequacy of traditional models of teaching, it 
does not define a particular teaching practice.  In addition, constructivism is diametrically 
opposed to some of the assumptions that appear to underpin currently dominant practices.  One is 
the underpinning belief that there is simple and certain knowledge of which the students should 
be appraised either through their own or others' efforts.  The view that knowledge can be handed 
down by authority is common amongst unsophisticated undergraduates (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; 
King & Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 1970) and may even be shared by those teachers who are either 
of the view that students are incapable of thinking for themselves (Detterman, 1993) or of the 
view that active learning is limited to reasoning about personal experience.  Much of the 
educational enterprise assumes safe and certain knowledge.  Educational assessment, to take but 
one very significant illustration, is replete with instances: there is the heavy reliance (for arguably 
good reason) on learning in higher education being evidenced through summative assessment 
(Maclellan 2004); there is the frequently rehearsed debate on how to 'give' assessment feedback 
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so that students can see what they need to do to 'improve' (Freeman & Lewis, 1998; Miller et al, 
1998; Sadler, 1989); and there are the contentious issues of reliability and validity in which not 
only is knowledge safe and certain, but it can also be ascribed coefficient values (Thorndike, 
1997).  The idea that there might be some received truth to be passed on as a commodity to some 
ignorant recipient is quite inconsistent with constructivism.  Constructivism does not assume that 
people are like empty vessels, to be filled up.  Yes, it is possible that students will have 
constructed knowledge other than what the teacher might consider to be useful pre-requisite 
knowledge for the teacher's intention, but this is not the same as saying that the student has no 
knowledge.  Further, constructivism would posit that the knowledge that the student has already 
constructed must have served some purpose for the student in the past, and that it is that 
knowledge which should be the springboard for further deliberations.  
A second assumption, evidenced in countless texts that purport to explain either course design or 
teaching, is that knowledge can be transmitted.  For example, guidance given by Forsyth et al 
(1995) suggests that teachers determine whether they want to  
pass on information, show examples or illustrations of the new information and how it works, give 
the learners second-hand experience by working through examples of the information in practice 
or place the learners in hands-on situations and require them to demonstrate their abilities with 
the new information (p. 27).   
Further, it is not unusual for teaching to be described in ways similar to those of Ashman & 
Conway (1997) who claim that the teacher's task includes the selection of content (to be 
determined through having a clear, unambiguous statement of the desired learning outcome either 
in terms of factual knowledge alone or in terms of facts plus processes) mastery of which is then 
modelled by the teacher and practised by the student.  Because of the assumption that it is 
possible for one person to understand pieces of knowledge that have been constructed by another, 
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almost all of our educational provision is represented in terms of knowledge transmission (of 
what is deemed important to 'know', of how this 'knowledge' will be imparted and of how the 
appropriated 'knowledge' can be assessed) thereby suggesting that knowledge construction is not 
within a particular context, for a particular purpose or by persons who wish to resolve particular 
problems (Newman & Archbald, 1992).  Furthermore, even if students do construct knowledge 
which for them is authentic, there is no assurance that what students learn corresponds to the 
teacher's knowledge.  There is thus no mechanism within constructivism to explain how 
knowledge can be transmitted from one person to another, or how knowledge can be conveyed 
'correctly' or even effectively (Pépin, 1998).   
A third assumption, related to the previous two, is that knowledge is a commodity that is passed 
on to others, regardless of the others' perceptions of the appropriateness of this knowledge to 
enable them to solve some problem.  Although the problem of inert knowledge was first 
recognised more than seventy years ago (Whitehead, 1929) and although there is considerable 
evidence that students fail to use their extant knowledge spontaneously, even when provided with 
cues and clues (Bransford et al, 2000), society's belief in the appropriateness of pre-determined 
curricula is nevertheless a dominant, if substantively contested, value (Brown, 2002; Bryce & 
Humes, 2003).  The many and frequent references to the importance of 'teaching the basics' is 
testimony to this belief.  Knowledge is thus seen as having helpful properties that can act in a 
preventative fashion (in much the same way as using contraception prevents pregnancy or 
medical immunisation prevents certain diseases) should particular circumstances prevail.  In this 
fashion, knowledge is equivalent to savings in the bank for a 'rainy day'.  However, as has already 
been stated, constructivism would claim that one only appropriates knowledge in the context of 
current understandings.  It is only if the individual anticipates that some particular knowledge 
may be useful in the future, say, that it will be attended to.  It is not therefore possible to construct 
knowledge and understanding in the present which will be of use in some future, unforeseeable 
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and unforeseen eventuality.  As Pépin (1998) persuasively argues, education conceived of as the 
transmission of safe and certain knowledge, to the great unknowing, for possible use at some 
indeterminate time in the future cannot be mediated by constructivism.   
5. IMPLICATIONS 
To the extent that behaviourism and constructivism, developed at different times in history, can 
only be partial accounts, their limitations have to be acknowledged.  However, it is the different 
social effects engendered by the accounts that are of interest.  Because they would seem to 
describe learning in quite different ways, they can also provide conceptual tools for organising 
learning experiences in different ways.  It is the nature of these learning experiences that is likely 
to leave learners with an overall, general, if perhaps ill defined, view of what learning means to 
them.  Because of behaviourism's focus on environmental structures such as reinforcement 
contingencies and contextual manipulation, the relevant planning and organisation involved in 
learning a complex act has to be determined by those who structure the environment.  This 
emphasis on extrinsic demands is manifest in the expectation that others will do the complex 
thinking for us and so results in a general notion of learning being what others want/require us to 
do.  Constructivism, on the other hand, focuses on the mental functioning of persons, either 
collectively or individually and so the learning of a complex act is both conceived and 
constrained by the learners' efforts to solve problems.  The planning and organisation involved in 
learning is a matter for the individual rather than environmental agencies and would follow the 
essential principle of teaching students to handle situations which they encounter when dealing 
with the world by using techniques which are applied by researchers.  The principal role of the 
teacher is to guide students to the generation of hypotheses, interpretation of data, and the 
development of constructs which are viewed, within their own fields of study, as appropriate 
ways of interpreting the world.  This approach focuses on the adequacy of the current 
paradigmatic viewpoint to demonstrate that investigations might be confirmatory, but equally, 
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that they may lead to the refutation of, and the suggestion of change from, the current point of 
view.  What ever the case, the major emphasis lies not with the content but with reflective 
criticism of research procedures and thought processes of authorities as it is through the process 
of reflective criticism that the students learn the procedures and thought processes of researchers 
and how to improve upon them.  Some readers may recognise this as a means of facilitating 
metacognition.  Thus teachers design situations so that students are caused to employ procedures 
that researchers use to recognise problems, to ask questions, to apply investigational procedures, 
and to provide consistent descriptions, predictions, and explanations which are compatible with 
shared experience of the world. 
Learning thus becomes a matter of developing, revising and refining the mental representations 
that one has for the rules and procedures for correct and efficient problem solving and has 
implications for both teacher and student roles.  Given that there is a primary emphasis on a 
problem-centred approach, that the focus lies with learning and applying appropriate 
investigational or analytical strategies, that memorising 'facts' which may arise is not as important 
as developing an understanding of concepts/constructs, students' learning stems from seeking 
responses to questions that are directly and immediately related to their experiences and activities.  
Students are thus encouraged to formulate the questions which interest them such that the search 
for understanding of one question invariably leads to the posing of other related questions so that 
investigation becomes a continuing event.  In this endeavour students exercise great deal of 
choice and share responsibility for learning.  This means that questions, investigations, rate of 
progress and learning are all highly individualised, so it does not make sense for the teacher to 
have instructional lessons for the whole class nor does it make sense to use traditional assessment 
instruments such as examinations when more authentic assessment is called for.  Key roles for the 
teacher include the provision of an appropriate question/framework in the absence of any student 
questions; a pedagogical emphasis on authentic tasks and ill-defined problems; and the 
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foregrounding of student responsibility to communicate their ideas to others and to defend and 
justify them in the face of challenge.   
6. CONCLUSION 
It has been argued in this article that the common sense notion of learning as the all-pervasive 
acquisition of new behaviour and/or knowledge, illuminated by experience, is an incomplete 
characterisation because it assumes firstly that acquisition constitutes learning without reference 
to transfer; and secondly that the learning of behaviour and the learning of knowledge are 
indistinguishable.  Without proposing unhelpfully simple dichotomies, the evidence reviewed 
here suggests clearly that some types of learning (such as learning to swim, bake a cake or change 
a car wheel) can be better explained as changes in behaviour, and other types of learning (such as 
learning to read, to derive implications or to analyse text) can be better explained as changes in 
symbolic manipulations in the head.  However, it is the latter type of learning, the learning of 
propositional knowledge, that is privileged in higher education (Eraut, 1994; Entwistle, 2000) 
because propositional knowledge provides the potential for the generation of new knowledge 
(Newmann & Archbald, 1992) which will be needed for solving the as yet unknown problems to 
be spawned in our complex, ever-changing world (Bowden & Marton, 1998).  Because higher 
education is trying to prepare students for a future which may be very different from the present, 
and because the best resource we have for preparing students is our current knowledge, in its 
many varieties, propositional knowledge would appear to be the most potentially productive to 
enable students to create further knowledge as and when new problems arise.  In order that 
students may profit from this propositional knowledge they must be required to engage in 
conceptual learning.  This in turn has implications for the pedagogical practices that should be 
deployed to promote conceptual learning. 
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